VII. To the Arguments for the Third Way

135. As to the arguments for the opinion [n.27] that posits charity in the concupiscible and hope in the irascible - these arguments are posited to prove a distinction between irascible and concupiscible in the will [nn.28-31] (where perhaps a distinction between them in the will, corresponding to the distinction of the moral virtues perfecting the will [n.39], should be conceded); but the distinction is not needed for the issue at hand.

136. But which of these two virtues are in the will as in the concupiscible?

The way the question is posed it will rather be hope, taking ‘desire’ strictly for ‘desire the advantageous for the desirer’ [nn.40, 58]. Absolutely however both these appetitive theological virtues are in the concupiscible, because the irascible is not of a nature to have God for immediate object, as is touched on by one of the arguments (against this opinion) about being irate [n.38], and it will be touched on below in the material on the moral virtues [d.34 nn.38, 48, 51].a

a.a[Interpolation: a synthesis of the whole question] The opinion that ‘hope is not a virtue distinct from faith or charity’ but either it is them, when it is perfect, or is a kind of faith, is not rejected. The opinion of Henry has four arguments and an addition about force. Proof of Henry’s first argument, as here above     etc .

     Solution: to desire God to be my good, from him as bestowing it on me for my merits, is a good act; therefore      there can be a virtue for it, and a theological one, because taken from the object, which is the first condition. The proof is that it is possible to have thed three conditions theologically, namely to have God as measure and efficient cause, although some virtue could be acquired. This act is not one of faith because it is not a believing; nor is it one of love, for three reasons - that it is for me, that it belongs to the affection for advantage, that it is separable.

     On the contrary: I desire naturally; someone in despair desires. There are two simultaneous acts: I desire from charity. And this is reduced by a likeness to faith, because I believe in him and for myself. Nor is it solved and reduced, because I desire for another.

     About absence, whether it is of the idea of the object and is obscure in respect of faith? For these are always so emptied that the habits are essentially imperfect, or imperfection is concomitant to them; and the like is objected about objects imperfectly.